Standing in the Line of Fire: Compulsory Campus Carry Laws and Hostile Speech Environments by Arnold, Cameron W.
ARNOLD (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019 10:19 AM 
 
807 
Standing in the Line of Fire: Compulsory Campus 
Carry Laws and Hostile Speech Environments 
Cameron W. Arnold 
I.INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 808 
II.COMPULSORY CAMPUS CARRY LAWS, GLASS V. PAXTON, AND THE 
PROBLEM OF STANDING ......................................................... 812 
A.  Campus Carry in the United States ................................. 812 
B.  Glass v. Paxton ............................................................... 813 
1.  Texas’s Campus Carry Law and the University of 
Texas’s Campus Carry Policy ................................... 813 
2.  The Lawsuit .............................................................. 815 
3.  The District Court Decisions .................................... 818 
4.  The Fifth Circuit Appeal ........................................... 820 
III.STANDING PROBLEMS IN COMPULSORY CAMPUS CARRY LAW 
CASES ..................................................................................... 824 
A.  Standing in Cases Involving “Probabilistic” First 
Amendment Injuries ....................................................... 825 
1.  Laird v. Tatum .......................................................... 826 
2.  Meese v. Keene ......................................................... 827 
3.  Clapper v. Amnesty International USA ..................... 828 
B.  Misapplication of the Supreme Court’s “Probabilistic” First 
Amendment Injury Jurisprudence to Compulsory Campus 
Carry Law Cases ............................................................. 829 
IV.THE HOSTILE SPEECH ENVIRONMENT ......................................... 834 
A.  Evolution of the Title VII Hostile Work Environment 
Framework ...................................................................... 834 
B.  From the Hostile Work Environment to the Hostile Speech 
Environment ................................................................... 839 
V.COMPULSORY CAMPUS CARRY LAWS AND THE HOSTILE SPEECH 
ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................... 840 
A.  Defining a Hostile Speech Environment Standard ......... 840 
 
 Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, Brooklyn Law School.  I wish to thank my wife, 
Danielle, and my sons, Maximilian and Gustavo, for all their love and support.  I also wish to 
thank Brooklyn Law School for supporting this Article with a Summer Research Stipend, the 
BLS Legal Writing faculty, especially Professors Joy Kanwar and Maria Termini, and my 
research assistants, Stephanie Coughlan, Tyler Gratton, and Michael Thorn. 
ARNOLD (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  10:19 AM 
808 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:807 
B.  Applying the Hostile Speech Environment Framework in 
Compulsory Campus Carry Law Cases .......................... 841 
VI.CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 846 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A first-year law student sits in her Constitutional Law class, listening 
intently but nervously.  All semester, the student’s professor has encouraged 
active class participation, and the student has been quick to raise her hand, 
engage with the class, and offer her views on the topic at hand.  Today, the 
class is discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence on reproductive rights.  The 
student has strong views on the issue, and she has always been outspoken 
about those views.  But this time, she feels great trepidation about speaking 
up.  The discussion is getting heated, and her law school is in a state that has 
enacted a “compulsory campus carry law”1—a state law that requires public 
colleges and universities to allow students with concealed carry permits to 
carry firearms on campus, even in the classroom.2  Keenly aware that one or 
more of her classmates could be armed, the student starts to raise her hand, 
but then hesitates.  Finally, she puts her hand down. 
Critics of compulsory campus carry laws have noted that permitting 
firearms in the classroom, as colleges and universities must do in states that 
have enacted such laws, implicates the First Amendment by chilling 
classroom speech.3  Unfortunately, as illustrated by the recent decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Glass v. Paxton, 
plaintiffs challenging compulsory campus carry laws on First Amendment 
grounds face a significant hurdle in establishing standing.4 
 
 1  See Shaundra K. Lewis, Crossfire on Compulsory Campus Carry Laws: When the 
First and Second Amendments Collide, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2109, 2111 (2017) [hereinafter 
Lewis, Crossfire]. 
 2  See id. 
 3  See Aurora Temple Barnes, Guns and Academic Freedom, 53 GONZ. L. REV. 45, 48 
(2017); Shaundra K. Lewis, Bullets and Books by Legislative Fiat: Why Academic Freedom 
and Public Policy Permit Higher Education Institutions to Say No to Guns, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 
1, 4 (2011) [hereinafter Lewis, Bullets and Books]; Shaundra K. Lewis & Daniel Alejandro 
De Luna, Symposium on “Texas Gun Law and the Future”: The Fatal Flaws in Texas’s 
Campus Carry Law, 41 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 135, 136 (2016); Laura Houser Oblinger, Note, 
The Wild, Wild West of Higher Education: Keeping the Campus Carry Decision in the 
University’s Holster, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 87, 89 (2013); Christopher M. Wolcott, Comment, 
The Chilling Effect of Campus Carry: How the Kansas Campus Carry Statute Impermissibly 
Infringes upon the Academic Freedom of Individual Professors and Faculty Members, 65 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 875, 877 (2017); Kathy L. Wyer, Comment & Note, A Most Dangerous 
Experiment? University Autonomy, Academic Freedom, and the Concealed-Weapons 
Controversy at the University of Utah, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 983, 985 (2003); Lewis, Crossfire, 
supra note 1, at 2111. 
 4  900 F.3d 233, 242 (5th Cir. 2018). 
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In Glass, the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court decision dismissing in 
its entirety a suit brought by three University of Texas at Austin (“UT”) 
professors against the State of Texas and UT.5  In their complaint, the 
professors challenged Texas’s compulsory campus carry law and UT’s 
policies implementing that law.6  The professors alleged, among other things, 
that requiring professors to allow students to carry firearms in the classroom 
violated the professors’ First Amendment right to academic freedom.7 
In upholding the district court’s dismissal of the professors’ complaint, 
the Fifth Circuit rejected the professors’ First Amendment claims in part 
because it concluded that the injury alleged by the professors was not 
“certainly impending,” as required by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,8 and in part because it concluded that 
the professors had failed to establish a direct causal connection between the 
chilling of their speech and specific actions of state and university officials.9  
According to the Fifth Circuit, because the professors independently “self-
censored” their speech out of fear of potential violence at the hands of 
hypothetical armed and angry students, their First Amendment claims rested 
on the speculative conduct of independent third parties.10 
 
 
 5  See Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV-845-LY, 2017 WL 4506806 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 
2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 6  Amended Complaint at 1–2, Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV-845-LY (W.D. Tex. July 
6, 2017). 
 7  Id. at 11.  This Article does not address the issues of whether, in cases challenging 
compulsory campus carry laws, students or professors would make better plaintiffs, or 
whether traditional free speech claims might fare better or worse than First Amendment 
claims based on academic freedom. Academic freedom claims brought by professors raise 
several unsettled issues: (1) uncertainty about whether the First Amendment creates a distinct 
right to academic freedom; see, e.g.,  Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000); 
W. Stuart Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish Out of Water, 77 
NEB. L. REV. 301, 302 (1998); Dahlia Lithwick & Richard C. Schragger, Jefferson v. 
Cuccinelli: Does the Constitution Really Protect a Right to “Academic Freedom”?, SLATE 
(June 1, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/06/jeffe 
rson_v_cuccinelli.html.  (2) uncertainty about whether, if it does, that right belongs to 
individual faculty members or just academic  institutions; see, e.g., Richard H. Hiers, 
Institutional Academic Freedom vs. Faculty Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and 
Universities: A Dubious Dichotomy, 29 J.C. & U.L. 35, 36 (2002); and (3) uncertainty about 
the extent to which the First Amendment protects public university and college professors’ 
right to free speech, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, which 
held that the First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech only if the employee 
speaks “as a citizen” and not “pursuant to their official duties.”  547 U.S. 410, 417, 421 (2006); 
see, e.g., Mark Strasser, Pickering, Garcetti, & Academic Freedom, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 579, 
594 (2018).  For a discussion of these issues in the campus carry context, see Lewis, Crossfire, 
supra note 1, at 2117–29. 
 8  568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013).  
 9  See Glass, 900 F.3d at 238–42. 
 10  Id. at 242. 
ARNOLD (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  10:19 AM 
810 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:807 
This Article asserts that the argument against standing in cases where 
plaintiffs challenge compulsory campus laws on First Amendment grounds 
is based on a narrow and imprecise view of injury and causation, and a 
misunderstanding of the plaintiffs’ allegations in these cases.  Plaintiffs who 
raise First Amendment challenges to compulsory campus carry laws do not 
solely claim that their speech is chilled by a potential threat of future 
violence; they also claim that the “mere presence,” or even potential 
presence, of firearms in the classroom presently creates an environment 
hostile to speech.11  Therefore, this Article proposes adopting a “hostile 
speech environment” framework12 for purposes of analyzing injury and 
causation in cases involving campus carry laws.  The hostile speech 
environment framework adapts a Title VII “hostile work environment” 
framework to a First Amendment context.13  This framework would permit 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that, although campus carry laws do not explicitly 
prohibit speech on campus, when state and university officials enact or 
implement such laws, they engage in conduct that is hostile toward 
classroom speech in a manner “‘sufficiently severe or pervasive’ as to 
reasonably affect [that] speech and create an environment objectively 
 
 11  See Barnes, supra note 3, at 79. 
The presence of concealed carry weapons within the classroom directs 
the content of the professor’s discourse away from controversial topics 
that may be contrary to popular opinion.  This aversion to provocative 
content to preserve the safety of the class impedes the free inquiry of 
scholarship, which is exactly what the doctrine of academic freedom was 
created to prevent. 
Id.; Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2117, 2127 (“[S]tate legislation that compels concealed 
carry of firearms on campus offends the post-secondary institutions’, the faculties’, and the 
students’ First Amendment rights to academic freedom and free speech because the very 
presence of firearms is likely to suppress freedom of thought and expression. . . .  The 
presence of guns inhibits students from freely exchanging ideas with each other.”); Lewis & 
De Luna, supra note 3, at 139 (“[T]he mere presence of firearms has already affected the way 
that some University of Houston professors teach.” (footnote omitted)); Oblinger, supra note 
3, at 109 (“Even if a shot is never fired, a gun’s presence can still have the effect of 
intimidation or suppression, which would inhibit healthy academic discourse.” (citing Joan 
H. Miller, Comment, The Second Amendment Goes to College, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 235, 
260 (2011))); see also Brief for Appellants at 15–16, 27, 34–35, Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 
233 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-50641), 2017 WL 5665494 at *15–16,*27, *34–35 [hereinafter 
Appellants’ Brief]; Reply Brief for Appellants at 4, 7–8, Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233 (5th 
Cir. 2018) (No. 17-50641), 2018 WL 841882, at *4, *7–8 [hereinafter Reply Brief]; 
Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 14, Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 
17-50641), 2018 WL 3634819, at *14 [hereinafter Supplemental Brief]; Brief for American 
Association of University Professors, Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, and 
Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 
5–6, 12, 17, 23, Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-50641), 2017 WL 
6506802, at *5–6, *12, *17, *23  [hereinafter AAUP Amicus Brief]. 
 12  This framework was first proposed in another context in S. Cagle Juhan, Note, Free 
Speech, Hate Speech, and the Hostile Speech Environment, 98 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1580 (2012). 
 13  See id. at 1579. 
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abusive towards that speech.”14  The hostile environment itself is a present 
injury causally connected to the conduct of state and university officials. 
Part II of this Article chronicles the history of the litigation in Glass and 
explores the nature of the allegations raised in that case.  Part III discusses 
the current standing framework applied by the Supreme Court in cases 
involving “probabilistic” First Amendment injuries—injuries based on 
possible, but not certain, “future threats.”15  This Part first discusses the 
development of that framework.  It then argues that this framework is ill-
suited for cases involving First Amendment challenges to compulsory 
campus carry laws because the injury alleged in compulsory campus carry 
cases is an environment that presently chills speech, rather than a chilling 
caused by fear of future harm. 
Part IV of this Article recommends adopting the hostile speech 
environment framework in cases involving First Amendment challenges to 
compulsory campus carry laws.  First, it traces the evolution of the hostile 
work environment framework, from its origins in the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
in Rogers v. EEOC,16 to its incorporation by the Equal Employment 
Commission (EEOC) into EEOC guidelines, and, finally, to its adoption by 
the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson17 and refinement 
in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.18  Second, it addresses the origins and 
philosophical underpinnings of the hostile speech environment framework, 
which incorporates “terminology from Title VII’s ‘hostile work 
environment’ framework” to address First Amendment issues involving 
campus speech.19 
Part V of this Article explains how the hostile speech environment 
cause of action would apply in the context of campus carry laws.  First, it 
defines a hostile speech environment standard.  Then, it explains how First 
Amendment challenges to compulsory campus carry laws and policies can 
be understood as arguments that these laws create an environment that is 
hostile toward classroom speech in a manner “‘sufficiently severe or 
pervasive’ as to reasonably affect [classroom] speech and create an 
 
 14  Id. at 1601 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Sav. 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). 
 15  See F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 57 (2012) 
(“Threatened future injuries are probabilistic; they might not occur.”); see also Andrew C. 
Sand, Note, Standing Uncertainty: An Expected-Value Standard for Fear-Based Injury in 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 113 MICH. L. REV. 711, 713 (2015) (“Probabilistic 
injury refers to any injury where it is uncertain that the underlying injury will actually 
occur . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 16  454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), disapproved by EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 
(1984). 
 17  477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
 18  510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993). 
 19  See Juhan, supra note 12, at 1579. 
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environment objectively abusive towards that speech.”20 
II. COMPULSORY CAMPUS CARRY LAWS, GLASS V. PAXTON, AND THE 
PROBLEM OF STANDING 
A. Campus Carry in the United States 
The term “campus carry laws” refers broadly to state statutes and 
regulations governing the carrying of firearms by students, faculty members, 
staff members, and visitors on the premises of state public institutions of 
higher education.21  “Compulsory campus carry laws” are state laws that 
require institutions of higher education to allow on their premises the 
carrying of firearms by, at the very least, students and faculty members.22 
Residents of all fifty states may carry concealed firearms in some 
locations in those states if “they meet certain state requirements.”23  The 
following sixteen states have enacted  “prohibitory campus carry laws,”24 
which explicitly prohibit individuals from carrying concealed firearms on 
the campuses of institutions of higher education: California, Florida, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, South 
Carolina, and Wyoming.25  The following twenty-three states either 
explicitly or implicitly allow institutions of higher education to decide for 
themselves whether to allow individuals to carry concealed firearms on their 
campuses: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New 
Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.26 
 
 
 20  Id. at 1601 (first quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; and then quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. 
at 65, 67). 
 21  See Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2111. 
 22  See id. 
 23  Guns on Campus: Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS (Aug. 14, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/guns-on-campus-overview.aspx.   
 24  Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2113. 
 25  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(h) (West 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06(12)(a), (13) 
(West 2017); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 66 / 65(a)(15) (West 2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 
14:95(A)(5)(a) (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10(j) (West 2015); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 28.425o(1)(h) (West 2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.107(1)(10) (West 2014); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1204.04(1) (West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.265(1)(e) 
(West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5(e)(1) (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-2.4(A) 
(West 2018); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01-a (McKinney 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-
269.2(b) (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13(1) (West 2015); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-23-420(A) (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(t)(x) (West 2018); see also Lewis, 
Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2113; Guns on Campus, supra note 23. 
 26  See Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2116; Guns on Campus, supra note 23. 
ARNOLD (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  10:19 AM 
2019] STANDING IN THE LINE OF FIRE 813 
The following ten states have enacted laws allowing concealed-carry 
permit holders to carry firearms on the campuses of institutions of higher 
education: Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, 
Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin.27  The following six states have 
enacted “compulsory campus carry laws,” which “limit the discretion of 
higher education institutions to decide whether to ban guns inside academic 
buildings[:] . . . Colorado, Idaho, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin.”28  
Tennessee law permits the carrying of firearms on campuses of institutions 
of higher learning by faculty members who are licensed to carry them, “but 
the law does not extend to students or the general public.”29  Nationally, the 
trend has been toward permitting more concealed firearms on college and 
university campuses.30 
B. Glass v. Paxton 
1. Texas’s Campus Carry Law and the University of Texas’s 
Campus Carry Policy 
To date, the most significant legal challenge to a state campus carry law 
has been Glass v. Paxton,31 in which three professors at UT challenged 
Texas’s campus carry law and UT’s policies implementing that law.  Texas’s 
campus carry law, passed as Senate Bill 1132 and codified into law in section 
411.2031 of the Texas Government Code,33 went into effect on August 16, 
2016.34  The statute allows a handgun “license holder”35 to “carry a 
 
 27  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-322(b)–(c) (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-
12-214(1)(a) (West 2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1 (West 2016); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
18-3309(1)–(2) (West 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c20(a) (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 97-37-17(6)(c) (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.370(3)(j) (West 2015); TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 411.2031(c) (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505.5(2) (West 2015); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 941.23(2)(d) (West 2016); Guns on Campus, supra note 23; Lewis, 
Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2116–17. 
 28  Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2114–15. 
 29  Guns on Campus, supra note 23. 
 30  See id.  (noting that “[i]n 2013, at least 19 states introduced legislation to allow 
concealed carry on campus in some regard and in the 2014 legislative session, at least 14 
states introduced similar legislation” and that, since 2015, three states (Arkansas, Georgia, 
and Texas) have “passed legislation to allow students and faculty to carry guns on college 
campuses” and one state (Ohio) passed legislation “lift[ing] [a] ban on firearms on college 
campuses and leav[ing] the decision to individual institutions”); see also Lewis, Crossfire, 
supra note 1, at 2113–17.  
 31  900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 32  S.B. 11, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).  
 33  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.2031 (West 2018). 
 34  See Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV-845-LY, 2017 WL 4506806, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 
6, 2017).  
 35  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 411.171–.209 (providing for the licensing of handguns in 
Texas). 
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concealed handgun on or about the license holder’s person while the license 
holder is on the campus of an institution of higher education.”36  It prohibits 
institutions of higher education from adopting policies that would bar 
“license holders from carrying handguns on the campus of the institution[s],” 
except as provided for in the statute.37 
The statute requires a university or college president, or other 
equivalent officer, to “establish reasonable rules, regulations, or other 
provisions” for implementing and executing the campus carry law.38  Before 
establishing such rules and regulations, however, the president or an 
equivalent officer must first “consult[] with students, staff, and faculty of the 
institution regarding the nature of the student population, specific safety 
considerations, and the uniqueness of the campus environment.”39 
The statute permits amendments to the relevant university policies by 
the president or an equivalent officer, “as necessary for campus safety.”40  It 
further allows the university’s or college’s “governing board” to amend the 
policies “wholly or partly.”41  It does not, however, allow the university or 
college to establish any policies that would “generally prohibit or have the 
effect of generally prohibiting license holders from carrying concealed 
handguns on [campus].”42  In an advisory opinion, the Attorney General of 
Texas interpreted this language as prohibiting any provision that would bar, 
or allow individual professors to bar, students from carrying firearms in 
university or college classrooms.43 
After the state enacted the campus carry law, UT formed a working 
group made up of members of the campus community.44  The group included 
“students, alumni, staff, and faculty.”45  The working group’s job was to 
recommend university policies that implemented and executed the law.46  
Prior to making its recommendations, the working group considered 
“thousands of comments from the public.”47  Many commenters expressed 
serious concerns that the presence or potential presence of firearms in the 
 
 36  Id. § 411.2031(b). 
 37  Id. § 411.2031(c). 
 38  Id. § 411.2031(d-1). 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. 
 41  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.2031(d-2). 
 42  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.2031(d-1) (West 2016). 
 43  Tex. Attorney Gen., Opinion Letter on Authority of an Institution of Higher Education 
to Establish Certain Rules Regarding the Carrying of Handguns on Campus, Op. No. KP-
0051 (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/o 
p/2015/kp0051.pdf. 
 44  See Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 45  Id.  
 46  Id. 
 47  Id. 
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classroom would chill classroom discussions.48 
The working group issued a final report, which recommended policies 
and procedures to UT’s president.49  The report contained summaries of 
stakeholders’ comments both for and against permitting students to carry 
concealed firearms inside classrooms.50  Although the working group 
sympathized “with the concerns about chilled speech,” it “recommended 
against banning concealed carry inside classrooms because [it believed that] 
such a regulation would likely violate the campus carry law by effectively 
prohibiting concealed carry for those traveling to campus to attend class.”51  
UT’s president ultimately “accepted the recommendations,”52 and UT’s 
Board of Regents “incorporated all . . . of the President’s new policies into 
the University’s operating procedures,”53 with the exception of one 
procedure “that prohibited license holders from keeping a live-round loaded 
in the chamber of their handguns while on campus.”54 
2. The Lawsuit 
On July 6, 2016, three UT professors, Dr. Jennifer Lynn Glass, Dr. Lisa 
Moore, and Dr. Mia Carter, filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas against UT and the State of Texas.55  
The professors alleged, among other things, that Texas’s compulsory campus 
carry law and UT’s policies implementing that law violated the First 
Amendment.56  According to the professors, “[c]ompelling professors at a 
public university to allow, without any limitation or restriction, students to 
carry concealed guns in their classrooms chills their First Amendment rights 
to academic freedom.”57 
The professors based their First Amendment cause of action on the 
premise that the presence of firearms in the classroom would chill classroom 
speech.58  The professors contended that 
 
 
 48  Id. at 236–37.  Supporters of the law, however, “countered that such fears [we]re 
unfounded, citing data ‘from the Texas Department of Public Safety establishing that license 
holders, as a group, are extremely law-abiding.’”  Id. at 237. 
 49  Id. at 236. 
 50  Glass, 900 F.3d at 236–37. 
 51  Id. at 237. 
 52  Id. at 236. 
 53  Id. at 237. 
 54  Id. at 237 n.1. 
 55  See generally Complaint, Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV-845-LY (W.D. Tex. July 6, 
2017).  The professors subsequently filed an amended complaint on August 9, 2016.  See 
generally Amended Complaint, supra note 6. 
 56  Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 11–15, 17–18. 
 57  Id. at 11. 
 58  Id. at 11–15. 
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robust academic debate in the classroom inevitably will be 
dampened to some degree by the fear that it could expose other 
students or themselves to gun violence by the professor’s 
awareness that one or more students has one or more handguns 
hidden but at the ready if the gun owner is moved to anger and 
impulsive action.59 
Referring to academic studies on the behavioral effects of individuals’ 
proximity to firearms, the professors argued that the hidden presence of 
handguns in the classroom would chill the speech of students carrying 
firearms and students who were in close proximity to those carrying 
firearms.60  The professors sought, among other things, a declaratory 
judgment that Texas’s compulsory campus carry law and UT’s policies 
implementing the law were unconstitutional, as well as preliminary and 
permanent injunctions prohibiting the implementation of the law and its 
attendant policies.61 
In their complaint, each of the three professors individually illustrated 
the potential chilling effect the presence of firearms would have in their 
classrooms.62  Each also expressed their own specific concerns about “[their] 
safety, and the safety of [their] students, as a result of the current concealed 
carry rules and [their] inability to bar concealed carry in [the] classroom.”63 
Professor Glass stated that she typically sought to “generate debate” in 
her courses, including one “on fertility and reproduction which include[d] 
classroom discussion on such currently volatile topics as abortion and 
unwanted pregnancies.”64  She maintained, however, that “[t]he possible 
presence of hidden weapons that can quickly deal death threaten[ed] to chill 
[her] manner of teaching.”65  To illustrate her point, Professor Glass 
described an incident “in her own classroom” in which “a verbally 
aggressive student, disappointed in a grade handed out during class, 
display[ed] a level of animosity and aggressiveness toward [her] teaching 
assistant.”66  According to Professor Glass, “had the current concealed carry 
rule been in place, [it] would have left her hesitant to confront the student in 
defense of her teaching assistant and urge a reasoned discussion of the matter 
at hand.”67 
 
 
 59  Id. at 12. 
 60  Id. at 12–13. 
 61  Id. at 19–20. 
 62  Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 13–15. 
 63  Id. at 13. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. at 13–14. 
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Professor Moore, who taught a class entitled “LGBT Literature and 
Culture,” asserted that “[p]rejudices against those who are part of the LGBT 
community has sometimes made the class a target of hate.”68  To illustrate 
her point, Professor Moore described incidents involving two students.69  
The first student “announced on the first day of class that she was enrolled 
to monitor and report on Professor Moore’s ‘homosexual agenda.’”70  The 
second student made “increasingly troubling statements, and [took] 
personally intrusive steps, toward the professor and his co-students, to the 
point that seemed personally threatening.”71  Professor Moore maintained 
that these incidents “dampened” classroom discussion, participation, and 
debate.72  She further stated that some students even dropped her class as a 
result of the second student’s conduct.73  According to Professor Moore, the 
“possibility of guns in the classroom would only have exacerbated the 
deleterious effect on academic discussion and freedom for those in the 
class.”74 
Professor Carter described her “courses in modern and contemporary 
cultures, both of which include[d] controversial topics such as imperialism 
and power structures related to sexuality and gender.”75  In these courses, 
Professor Carter employed a “pedagogic approach [that] emphasize[d] 
dialogue and debate and the critical examination of one’s own ideas and 
others’ beliefs.”76  According to Professor Carter, “[e]ngendering a 
community of trust is crucial for the classroom to work as it should.”77  
Therefore, “[t]he potential of having a student carrying a weapon in the 
classroom would jeopardize the community of trust and be destructive to the 
dynamic educational process.”78 
Professor Carter also maintained that “[f]urther exacerbating this 
situation would be the presence of students with mental health issues, a 
situation that the professor ha[d] encountered in the past.”79  According to 
Professor Carter, who claimed that she and her students had been threatened 
in the past, “[a]ll this would be made even worse were guns allowed into the 
classroom, with the consequence that classroom debate would be chilled to 
 
 68  Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 14. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 14. 
 75  Id. at 14–15. 
 76  Id. at 14. 
 77  Id. at 15. 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. 
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a greater degree.”80 
In support of their argument that “the hidden presence of handguns” 
exacerbates the “problem of squelched academic debate and discussion,” the 
professors referred to “peer-reviewed academic studies” about the “weapons 
effect.”81  The professors maintained that “[t]hese academic studies show 
that the presence of handguns changes people’s behavior.”82  More 
specifically, “[t]hose who are already agitated will behave more aggressively 
if they[] see, talk about, handle[,] or even think about a nearby gun.”83  
According to the professors, “the behavioral effect of being near a weapon 
applies not only to the person in possession of the gun but also to other 
classmates if they are aware that some other student in the class is armed.”84 
3. The District Court Decisions 
On August 22, 2016, the district court denied the professors’ motion for 
a preliminary injunction.85  Because of the procedural posture of the case, 
the district court’s decision reached “only [the professors’] request for 
immediate relief and ma[de] no final ruling on any asserted issue.”86  
Nevertheless, the district court based its ruling in part on its conclusion that 
the professors had “failed to establish a substantial likelihood of ultimate 
success on the merits” on any of their claims.87 
In addressing the professors’ First Amendment claim, the district court 
focused largely on what it perceived to be the professors’ failure to establish 
a causal connection between the chilling of their speech, and the conduct of 
state and university officials.88  According to the district court, even if the 
facts alleged in the professors’ complaint were true, they were insufficient to 
establish a First Amendment violation because the professors had censored 
their speech out of fear of being shot by some hypothetical armed and angry 
student, and not because the state or the university had prohibited the 
professors from speaking.89 
The district court stated that “[t]he burden of which [the professors] 
complain[ed] . . . [did] not fit within any recognized right of academic 
freedom,” because “neither the Campus Carry Law nor the Campus Carry 
 
 80  Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 15. 
 81  Id. at 12–13. 
 82  Id. at 13. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV-845-LY, 2016 WL 8904948, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 
2016). 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at *6. 
 88  Id. at *4–6. 
 89  Id. 
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Policy [wa]s a content-based regulation of speech, nor c[ould] either 
reasonably be construed as a direct regulation of speech.”90  The district court 
further contended that Texas’s campus carry law and UT’s policy did “not 
direct [the professors] either toward or away from any particular subject or 
point of view” or forbid them from “speak[ing] and teach[ing] freely.”91 
On July 6, 2017, the district court granted the State of Texas’s and UT’s 
various motions to dismiss the professors’ Amended Complaint in its 
entirety.92  The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, ruling that the professors lacked standing under Article 
III.93  In so ruling, the district court relied in part, on the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Laird v. Tatum94 and Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,95 
both of which involved allegations of First Amendment chill.  The district 
court concluded not only that the professors had failed to establish an injury-
in-fact but that they also failed to demonstrate “that [their] alleged injury 
[wa]s traceable to any conduct of Defendants.”96  In particular, the district 
court concluded that the professors failed to establish that the chilling of their 
speech was “fairly traceable to the Campus Carry Law and Campus Carry 
Policy.”97 
The district court noted that the Supreme Court had been “reluctan[t] to 
endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of 
independent actors.”98  The district court characterized the basis of the 
professors’ First Amendment claim as a “self-imposed censoring of 
classroom discussions caused by their fear of the possibility of illegal activity 
by persons not joined in this lawsuit.”99  According to the district court, the 
professors presented “no concrete evidence to substantiate their fears, but 
instead rest[ed] on ‘mere conjecture about possible . . . actions.’”100  
 
 90  Id. at *3–4 (citing Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 188 (1990)) (stating that the 
district court “ha[d] found no precedent for Plaintiffs’ proposition that there is a right of 
academic freedom so broad that it allows them such autonomous control of their classrooms—
both physically and academically—that their concerns override decisions of the legislature 
and the governing body of the institution that employs them”). 
 91  Glass, 2016 WL 8904948, at *4 (citing Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 198). 
 92  Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV-845-LY, 2017 WL 4506806, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 
2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 93  Id. at *3.  
 94  408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 95  568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
 96  Glass, 2017 WL 4506806, at *3 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)).  
 97  Id.  
 98  Id. (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414); see also Clapper, 568 U.S. at 413 (“In the past, 
we have been reluctant to endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how 
independent decisionmakers will exercise their judgment.”). 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 420). 
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The district court further maintained that the professors neither 
“challenge[d] a direct regulation or restriction on speech,” specified “a 
subject matter or point of view they feel they must eschew as a result of the 
Campus Carry Law and Campus Carry Policy,” nor pointed “to a specific 
harm they ha[d] suffered or w[ould] suffer as a result of the law and 
policy.”101  Instead, the court contended, the professors pointed only to an 
alleged “chilling effect” that “appear[ed] to arise from [the professors’] 
subjective belief that a person may be more likely to cause harm to a 
professor or student as a result of the law and policy.”102 
4. The Fifth Circuit Appeal 
The professors appealed the decision of the district court to the Fifth 
Circuit.103  In their briefs, the professors and Amici clarified that the 
professors’ First Amendment claims were not based solely on the allegation 
that fear of violent reprisals from armed students caused the professors to 
self-censor.104  Instead, the professors also alleged that the presence of 
firearms in the classroom created an environment of intimidation that itself 
chilled speech.105 
The professors argued that Texas’s compulsory Campus Carry Law and 
the university’s policy implementing that law “creat[ed] an unavoidable 
pressure pushing against exploration of matters that are of the moment 
controversial” and “ha[d] the effect of lessening the vigor and extent of the 
ideas explored in college classroom teaching.”106  According to the 
professors, the mere knowledge that their classmates might be carrying guns 
would cause faculty and students to refrain from addressing controversial 
 
 101  Id. 
 102  Glass, 2017 WL 4506806, at *3. 
 103  See Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 104  See Reply Brief, supra note 11, at 4 (chiding the district court for reducing the 
professors’ “specific allegations about the inter-relation of academic pedagogy, hidden 
weaponry they could not keep from their classrooms, and historic experience with the great 
human damage done by guns in the hands of college students to being nothing more than a 
‘self-imposed censoring of classroom discussions’ caused by fear”); Supplemental Brief, 
supra note 11, at 14 (“It is not their (or their students) being shot or having a gun waived in 
their face that is the immediate concern in terms of classroom pedagogy and method.  It is the 
context, both immediate and historical, that affects their conduct of the classroom.”); AAUP 
Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 12 (“Plaintiffs allege (and social science confirms) that the 
presence of guns—even if not flourished or discharged—can significantly alter the dynamics 
of provocative exchanges.”); see also id. at 17 (“The alleged chill does not depend on 
uncertain third-party actions, such as a student brandishing or firing a handgun . . . .”). 
 105  See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 15–16, 27, 34–35; Reply Brief, supra note 11, 
at 4, 7–8; Supplemental Brief, supra note 11, at 14; AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 
5–6, 12, 17, 23. 
 106  Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 27. 
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topics.107  The professors chided the district court for 
reduc[ing] their specific allegations about the inter-relation of 
academic pedagogy, hidden weaponry they could not keep from 
their classrooms, and historic experience with the great human 
damage done by guns in the hands of college students to being 
nothing more than a “self-imposed censoring of classroom 
discussions” caused by fear.108 
They maintained that “[i]t is not [the professors’] (or their students) being 
shot or having a gun waived in their face that is the immediate concern in 
terms of classroom pedagogy and method.  It is the context, both immediate 
and historical, that affects their conduct of the classroom.”109 
The professors challenged the notion that the alleged injury was 
speculative or based on some fear of future injury.  They maintained that 
they did “not assert[] that sometime in the future they may decide that they 
need to curtail their classroom teaching activities because of [the] 
implementation [of Texas’s campus carry law] at  [UT].”110  Instead, they 
were asserting that the law’s “implementation w[ould] affect them presently, 
leading them to dampen the kind of intellectual inquiry that they normally 
engage in with their students in class.”111  According to the professors, “from 
the beginning of guns-in-the-classroom, academic activities will be 
adversely affected.”112  Finally, the professors connected the chilling of their 
speech to the conduct of state and university officials, maintaining that 
the facts at this stage of the case point to a direct link between the 
challenged policy and the lessening of debate and discussion—a 
shortening of the academic spectrum—in these professors’ 
classrooms.  The intimidatory impact of an official policy that 
prevents the exclusion of guns from their classrooms lessens First 
Amendment activity in these three professors’ classrooms.113 
The American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”), the 
Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, and the Brady Center to 
Prevent Gun Violence (collectively, the “Amici”) jointly filed an amicus 
brief in support of the professors.114  The Amici characterized the professors’ 
 
 107  Id. at 16. 
 108  Reply Brief, supra note 11, at 4 (citation omitted). 
 109  Supplemental Brief, supra note 11, at 14. 
 110  Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 34. 
 111  Id. at 34–35. 
 112  Id. at 35; see also Reply Brief, supra note 11, at 7–8 (“The guns-in-the-classroom 
mandate is a concrete fact, in place since the fall semester of 2016. Its adverse impact occurred 
from the moment the policy was forced into effect and imposed on these three professors in 
particular to deny them any options to ban the guns from their classrooms that the state 
officials have told them they must allow in with those students who wish to tote them.”). 
 113  Supplemental Brief, supra note 11, at 15. 
 114  See AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 3–6. 
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“core contention” as the proposition “that admitting handguns into 
classrooms alters the educational environment,”115 and their alleged injury 
as “chill arising from a necessary accommodation to the potential presence 
of firearms in the classroom and students’ knowledge of that potential.”116  
According to the Amici, the Professors’ “allegations articulate[d] a 
widespread belief among educators that the presence of guns interferes with 
pedagogy.”117 
The Amici further argued that the Professors’ allegations could not 
“reasonably be dismissed as ‘subjective fear,’”118 in part because they were 
not based solely on fear of some future violent reprisal.119  According to the 
Amici, the chill alleged by the Professors did “not depend on uncertain third-
party actions, such as a student brandishing or firing a handgun.”120  Instead, 
the professors alleged “(and social science confirm[ed]) that the presence of 
guns—even if not flourished or discharged—can significantly alter the 
dynamics of provocative exchanges.”121 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the 
professors lacked standing on all claims.122  In affirming the district court’s 
decision on the First Amendment cause of action, the Fifth Circuit, like the 
district court before it, focused on a perceived lack of injury, and lack of a 
causal connection between the chilling of the professors’ speech and the 
conduct of state or university officials.123  Like the district court, the Fifth 
Circuit relied on Laird and Clapper.124  Applying these cases, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that the professors “lacked standing because [they] alleged 
a ‘subjective’ First Amendment chill that was contrary to the presumption 
[their] students ‘will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid 
prosecution and conviction.’”125  
The Fifth Circuit asserted that whether the professors had “standing 
[turned] on whether the alleged harm threatened by concealed-carrying 
students [was] ‘certainly impending.’”126  The court concluded that the 
 
 115  Id. at 5. 
 116  Id. at 17–18. 
 117  Id. at 6. 
 118  Id. at 5. 
 119  Id. at 5, 12–13, 17. 
 120  AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 17; see also id. at 23 (“Plaintiffs’ alleged chill 
does not turn on a belief that, as the Attorney General flamboyantly put it in the court below, 
‘adults who have been licensed to carry handguns could attack them at any moment if they 
say anything potentially controversial in class.’”). 
 121  Id. at 12. 
 122  Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 123  Id. at 238–42. 
 124  Id. 
 125  Id. at 238 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974)). 
 126  Id. at 240. 
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professors lacked standing because their “allegation[s] of harm involve[d] a 
‘chain of contingencies’” and “[e]ach link in the chain of contingencies” was 
not “certainly impending.”127 
The Fifth Circuit characterized the professors’ alleged injury as 
follows: the professors’ “fear of potential violent acts by firearm-carrying 
students prompt[ed] [them] to self-censor by avoiding topics [they] worr[ied] 
might incite such violence or intimidation, which would be unnecessary but 
for the law and policy that prevent[ed] [them] from banning firearms in 
[their] classroom[s].”128  The court concluded that “[u]ltimately, whether 
concealed-carrying students pose certain harm to [the professors] turns on 
their independent decision-making.”129  Therefore, “[b]ecause [the 
professors] fail[ed] to allege certainty as to how these students w[ould] 
exercise their future judgment, the alleged harm [wa]s not certainly 
impending.”130  According to the court, the professors could not 
“manufacture standing by self-censoring [their] speech based on what [they] 
allege[d] to be a reasonable probability that concealed-carry license holders 
w[ould] intimidate professors and students in the classroom.”131 
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the professors had put forward 
opinion evidence from “multiple University faculty members and multiple 
national educational organizations” who “believe[d] that the presence of 
guns in the classroom w[ould] chill professors’ speech,” and that the 
Professors had even “cite[d] to various academic studies discussing a so-
called ‘weapons effect,’” whereby “the hidden presence of guns does 
threaten disruption of classroom activities, increases the likelihood that 
violence will erupt in the classroom, and intimidates non-carrying students—
and undoubtedly professors, too.”132  The court, however, concluded “that 
 
 127  Id. at 239 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–14 (2013)). 
 128  Glass, 900 F.3d at 240. 
 129  Id at 241. 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. at 242. 
 132  Id. at 240.  The Fifth Circuit was referring to the amicus brief filed by the Amici.  See 
generally AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11.  In the brief, the Amici maintained that 
“[s]tudies dating back to 1967 have demonstrated the ‘weapons effect’: the tendency of 
provoked individuals to behave aggressively when in the presence of actual guns, pictures of 
guns, and even words referring to weapons.”  Id. at 21 (first citing Leonard Berkowitz & 
Anthony LePage, Weapons as Aggression-Eliciting Stimuli, 7 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 202, 202 (1967); and then citing Arlin James Benjamin, Jr. & Brad J. Bushman, The 
Weapons Effect, 19 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHOL. 93, 96 (2018)).  According to the Amici, the 
research both “suggests that carrying a concealed weapon can increase aggressive behavior 
by the person carrying” and “demonstrates that words or pictures of guns exert a priming 
effect on individuals—even if they themselves are not carrying guns—triggering the 
accessibility of aggressive concepts.  Id. at 21–22 (first citing David Hemenway et al., Is an 
Armed Society a Polite Society? Guns and Road Rage, 38 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 
687, 687 (2006); and then citing Craig A. Anderson et al., Does the Gun Pull the Trigger? 
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none of the cited evidence alleges a certainty that a license-holder will 
illegally brandish a firearm in a classroom.”133 
III. STANDING PROBLEMS IN COMPULSORY CAMPUS CARRY LAW CASES 
As the Glass decisions demonstrate, plaintiffs seeking to challenge 
compulsory campus carry laws face a significant hurdle: establishing, for 
purposes of Article III standing, a causal connection between the chilling of 
their speech and the conduct of state and university officials.134  The 
professors’ claims failed in Glass because, in assessing injury and causation, 
the district court and the Fifth Circuit applied a rigid application of the 
current Supreme Court framework for analyzing Article III standing in cases 
involving what some scholars have called “probabilistic” First Amendment 
injuries—injuries based on possible, but not certain, “future threats.”135  As 
discussed below, even assuming the courts in Glass correctly applied the 
Supreme Court’s “probabilistic” First Amendment injury framework, the 
framework is ill-suited for compulsory campus carry cases.  The 
“probabilistic” First Amendment injury framework applies to cases in which 
speech is chilled by a fear of future harm.  In contrast, in campus carry cases, 
the alleged chill is caused by a present injury: an “altered educational 
environment” of fear and intimidation that itself chills speech.136 
 
 
 
 
 
Automatic Priming Effects of Weapons Pictures and Weapon Names, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 308, 
308 (1998)).  The Amici concluded, “[i]n other words, the ‘mere presence of weapons’ 
magnifies both aggressive cognition and aggressive conduct—particularly in stressful 
situations.  And this heightened aggression afflicts both those who carry weapons and those 
who perceive their mere presence.”  Id. at 22. 
 133  Glass, 900 F.3d at 241. 
 134  See Barnes, supra note 3, at 83 (noting, prior to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Glass, 
that the plaintiffs in that case must establish “that the state law is closely related to the 
infringement of their academic freedom,” and concluding that “[i]f the imposition on their 
academic freedom is too ‘remote and attenuated’ from the state and university action, their 
case will fail.” (quoting Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 200 (1990))). 
 135  See Hessick, supra note 15, at 57; Sand, supra note 15, at 713. 
 136  See AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 5–6 (“Plaintiffs’ core contention [is] that 
admitting handguns into classrooms alters the educational environment . . . .  Plaintiffs’ 
allegations articulate a widespread belief among educators that the presence of guns interferes 
with pedagogy, a belief confirmed by social science research demonstrating that the very 
presence of guns can propel discomfort into overt aggression, even if no one threatens an 
actual shooting.”); see also Barnes, supra note 3, at 83 (“[I]f the presence of guns creates an 
‘atmosphere of suspicion and distrust’ within which ‘scholarship cannot flourish,’ academic 
freedom has been infringed.” (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 
(1957))). 
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A. Standing in Cases Involving “Probabilistic” First Amendment 
Injuries 
Federal courts apply a three-part test to determine whether a plaintiff 
has standing under Article III.137  First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
plaintiff “suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, 
not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”‘“138  Second, the plaintiff must establish 
“a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.”139  
The injury must “be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third 
party not before the court.’”140  Finally, the plaintiff must show that it is 
“‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be 
‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”141 
Frederick Shauer has defined a chilling injury as an injury that “occurs 
when individuals seeking to engage in activity protected by the [F]irst 
[A]mendment are deterred from so doing by governmental regulation not 
specifically directed at that protected activity.”142  Although the government 
regulation at issue may have only an “indirect effect on the exercise of First 
Amendment rights,” to establish standing, plaintiffs alleging such injuries 
must still establish that the regulation directly injured them.143 
In assessing standing in Glass, both the Fifth Circuit and the district 
court rigidly applied Supreme Court precedent involving “probabilistic” 
First Amendment injuries.144  The court considered the following Supreme 
 
 137  See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 738 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (holding that, to establish standing, “[a] 
plaintiff must allege [1] personal injury [2] fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly 
unlawful conduct and [3] likely to be redressed by the requested relief”). 
 138  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)) (first citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 756; then 
citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); and then citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U.S. 727, 740–41 n.16 (1972)). 
 139  Id. at 560. 
 140  Id. at 560–61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 
(1976)). 
 141  Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43). 
 142  Frederick Shauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling 
Effect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978); see also Jonathan R. Siegel, Note, Chilling Injuries 
as a Basis for Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 905, 913 (1989) (“[G]overnment action that exerts only 
a chilling effect on expression, by definition, does not directly and affirmatively prohibit it.”). 
 143  Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1972). 
 144  Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 238–42 (5th Cir. 2018); Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV-
845-LY, 2017 WL 4506806, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 
2018). 
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Court cases in its analysis: Laird v. Tatum,145 Meese v. Keene,146 and Clapper 
v. Amnesty International USA.147 
1. Laird v. Tatum 
In Laird v. Tatum, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs alleging a First 
Amendment chill based on fear of a future injury could not establish standing 
by alleging a mere “subjective ‘chill.’”148  There, the plaintiffs alleged that 
their First Amendment rights were violated by a United States Army 
program, in which Army intelligence collected data about civilian activities 
deemed potentially disruptive.149  According to the plaintiffs, the program’s 
“very existence” impermissibly chilled their speech.150 
The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could 
not establish an injury that was fairly traceable to the Army’s conduct.151  
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations amounted to claims “of 
a subjective ‘chill’” based on speculation about some undetermined future 
harm.152  According to the Court, “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not 
an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a 
threat of specific future harm.”153 
The Court acknowledged that its precedent supported the proposition 
that laws and regulations that do not directly prohibit or restrict speech may 
still violate the First Amendment by indirectly chilling speech.154  It 
maintained, however, that none of its prior cases permitted standing based 
on plaintiffs’ fear of some uncertain, hypothetical future government 
action.155  The Court concluded that, to establish standing under its 
 
 145  408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 146  481 U.S. 465 (1987). 
 147  568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
 148  Laird, 408 U.S. at 13–14. 
 149  Id. at 2. 
 150  Id. at 13. 
 151  Id.  
 152  Id. at 13 & n.7 (stating that plaintiffs based their allegations on “speculative 
apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date misuse the information in some way 
that would cause [plaintiffs] direct harm”).   
 153  Id. at 13–14. 
 154  See Laird, 408 U.S. at 11 (first citing Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); 
then citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); then citing Lamont v. 
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); and then citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964)) 
(“In recent years this Court has found in a number of cases that constitutional violations may 
arise from the deterrent, or “chilling,” effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a 
direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights.”); see also id. at 12–13 
(“The decisions in these cases fully recognize that governmental action may be subject to 
constitutional challenge even though it has only an indirect effect on the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.”). 
 155  See id. at 11 (“In none of these cases, however, did the chilling effect arise merely 
ARNOLD (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  10:19 AM 
2019] STANDING IN THE LINE OF FIRE 827 
precedent, plaintiffs must show that they “ha[ve] sustained, or [are] 
immediately in danger of sustaining, a direct injury as the result of [the 
relevant government] action.”156  According to the Court, the plaintiffs “d[id] 
not meet this test.”157 
2. Meese v. Keene 
Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court addressed another alleged 
“probabilistic” First Amendment injury in Meese v. Keene,158 this time with 
a much different result.  There, the Court reiterated that plaintiffs may still 
establish injury and causation by showing that their speech was chilled by a 
law or regulation that does not directly target or infringe upon that speech.159 
In Keene, the plaintiff, a lawyer and California state senator, sought to 
show films that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had identified as “political 
propaganda” under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (the 
“Registration Act”).160  The plaintiff sued to enjoin the DOJ from so 
designating the films.161 
The Court held that the plaintiff established standing to challenge the 
DOJ’s application of the Registration Act.162  The Court determined that the 
plaintiff had adequately demonstrated both an injury-in-fact and a causal 
connection between that injury and the DOJ’s conduct.163  The Court 
distinguished Laird.164  It noted that, unlike the plaintiffs in Laird, the 
plaintiff in the case before it had “alleged and demonstrated more than a 
‘subjective chill.’”165  The plaintiff did not rely on mere allegations that the 
DOJ’s designation of the films as “political propaganda” had chilled his 
speech by deterring him from showing the films.166  Instead, he alleged and 
provided evidence that “if he were to exhibit the films while they bore such 
characterization, his personal, political, and professional reputation would 
suffer and his ability to obtain re-election and to practice his profession 
 
from the individual’s knowledge that a governmental agency was engaged in certain activities 
or from the individual’s concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those activities, the 
agency might in the future take some other and additionl [sic] action detrimental to that 
individual.”). 
 156  Id. at 13 (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)). 
 157  Id. 
 158  481 U.S. 465 (1987). 
 159  Id. at 472–74. 
 160  Id. at 467. 
 161  Id. at 468. 
 162  Id. at 472–77. 
 163  See id. at 472–74. 
 164  Meese, 481 U.S. at 472–74. 
 165  Id. at 473. 
 166  Id.  
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would be impaired.”167 
The Court acknowledged that the DOJ’s designation of the film did not 
directly infringe on the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights because it did not 
actually prohibit the plaintiff from acquiring or showing the films.168  It 
maintained, however, that “[w]hether the statute [itself] in fact constitutes an 
abridgement of the plaintiff’s freedom of speech is . . . irrelevant to the 
standing analysis.”169 
3. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA 
More recently, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,170 the Court 
held that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing because they could not 
show that their “threatened injury” was “certainly impending.”171  According 
to the Court, “[a]llegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.”172  In 
Clapper, a group of attorneys and journalists challenged, on First 
Amendment grounds, section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978 (the “Surveillance Act”),173 which permits the surveillance by 
the United States of certain foreign individuals.174  The plaintiffs argued that 
the Surveillance Act chilled their speech by causing them to refrain from 
communicating with “likely targets of surveillance” with whom their work 
“require[d] them to engage in sensitive international communications.”175  
According to the plaintiffs, “there w[as] an objectively reasonable likelihood 
that their communications [would] be acquired under [the Surveillance 
Act] at some point in the future.”176 
The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.177  The Court 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations of injury “relie[d] on a highly 
attenuated chain of possibilities”178 involving “speculation about the 
decisions of independent actors.”179  According to the Court, the plaintiffs 
could not “manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves 
based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly 
 
 167  Id. (quoting Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (E.D. Cal. 1983)). 
 168  Id.  
 169  Id. at 473 (quoting Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111, 1118 (E.D. Cal. 1985)). 
 170  568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
 171  Id. at 401, 410. 
 172  Id. at 409 (citations omitted). 
 173  50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2018). 
 174  Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401. 
 175  Id.  
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. at 422. 
 178  Id. at 410. 
 179  Id. at 414.  
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impending.”180  
Significantly, although the Court articulated a “requirement that 
‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in 
fact,’”181 the text of footnote five of the decision suggested a different 
standard: the “substantial risk” standard.182  In footnote five, the Court stated: 
Our cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that 
it is literally certain that the harms they identify will come about.  
In some instances, we have found standing based on a “substantial 
risk” that the harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to 
reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.183 
However, the Court concluded, “to the extent that the ‘substantial risk’ 
standard is relevant and is distinct from the ‘clearly impending’ requirement, 
respondents fall short of even that standard, in light of the attenuated chain 
of inferences necessary to find harm here.”184  A year later, in Susan B. 
Anthony List v. Driehaus,185 the Court, citing Clapper, stated that “[a]n 
allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly 
impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”186 
B. Misapplication of the Supreme Court’s “Probabilistic” First 
Amendment Injury Jurisprudence to Compulsory Campus Carry 
Law Cases 
In Glass, the district court and the Fifth Circuit rigidly applied the 
Supreme Court’s “probabilistic” First Amendment injury framework.  Both 
courts relied on Laird and Clapper.187 In particular, both courts strictly 
 
 180  Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416 (citations omitted). 
 181  Id. at 410 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). 
 182  Id. at 414 n.5; see also Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or 
Three Competing Philosophies of Standing Law?, 81 TENN. L. REV. 211, 230 (2014) (“[T]his 
footnote acknowledged that the Court had sometimes used a ‘substantial risk’ test for standing 
injury that is arguably different from the ‘certainly impending’ test used by the majority in 
the rest of its opinion.”). 
 183  Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5 (first citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 
U.S. 139, 153–55 (2010); then citing Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988); then 
citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1000–01 (1982); and then citing Babbitt v. United 
Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).  
 184  Id. (“In addition, plaintiffs bear the burden of pleading and proving concrete facts 
showing that the defendant’s actual action has caused the substantial risk of harm.  Plaintiffs 
cannot rely on speculation about ‘the unfettered choices made by independent actors not 
before the court.’” (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992))). 
 185  573 U.S. 149 (2014). 
 186  Id. at 158 (emphasis added) (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409, 414 n.5). 
 187  See Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 238–42 (5th Cir. 2018); Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-
CV-845-LY, 2017 WL 4506806, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 
2018). 
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applied the “certainly impending” standard from Clapper.188  The Fifth 
Circuit, moreover, distinguished Keene.189  Both courts then concluded that 
because neither campus carry laws nor university policies that implement 
those laws directly prohibit or restrict speech, any injury alleged in such 
cases is not “certainly impending,” but is rather a mere “subjective chill” 
involving “a chain of contingencies” that requires speculation about the 
future conduct of third parties.190  The courts further rejected the notion of a 
causal connection between the chilling of classroom speech and compulsory 
campus carry laws or university policies implementing those laws, 
contending that any such link would necessarily be based on speculation that 
armed students would react violently to plaintiff’s speech.191  Therefore, 
according to the courts, any attempt at establishing injury-in-fact or 
causation in compulsory campus carry law cases must fail under Laird and 
Clapper.192 
Relying on the Supreme Court’s “probabilistic” First Amendment 
injury framework to bar standing in compulsory campus carry cases is 
problematic for two reasons.  First, after Clapper, uncertainty remains about 
the application and “scope” of the “certainly impending” standard.193  
Second, the framework is inapplicable to compulsory campus carry cases 
because the injury alleged in such cases is not a “probabilistic” injury. 
As an initial matter, the courts in Glass failed to acknowledge the 
current ambiguity about the scope and applicability of the “certainly 
impending standard.”194  The Court’s references in Clapper to both “the 
certainly impending” standard and the “substantial risk” standard left some 
uncertainty as to which standard it would apply in future cases.195  Its 
 
 188  See Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 238–42 (5th Cir. 2018); Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-
CV-845-LY, 2017 WL 4506806, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 233 (5th 
Cir. 2018). 
 189  See Glass, 900 F.3d at 242 (“Although Keene’s allegation of harm involved the 
contingency of individual voter decisions, he nonetheless alleged certainty about voter 
decision-making based on supporting affidavits and opinion polling.”). 
 190  See Glass, 900 F.3d at 238–42; Glass, 2017 WL 4506806, at *3 
 191  Id. 
 192  Id. 
 193  Standing—Challenges to Government Surveillance—Clapper v. Amnesty 
International USA, 127 HARV. L. REV. 298, 298 (2013) (noting that Clapper “left the scope 
of the ‘certainly impending’ standard unclear”). 
 194  Id. 
 195  See Courtney Chin, Note, Standing Still: The Implications of Clapper for 
Environmental Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Standing, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323, 325–36 
(2015) (“An important concession in footnote 5 of Clapper also leaves open the possibility 
that plaintiffs may demonstrate injury in fact based on a ‘substantial risk’ of harm.”) 
(emphasis in original); Mank, supra note 182, at 230 (noting that “footnote [5] acknowledged 
that the Court had sometimes used a ‘substantial risk’ test for standing injury that is arguably 
different from the ‘certainly impending’ test used by the majority in the rest of its opinion”). 
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reference to both standards in Driehaus did not clear things up.196  As some 
commentators have noted, it is particularly unclear “whether its approach to 
standing was generally applicable to all cases or whether it was more limited 
to standing in intelligence-gathering and foreign affairs cases.”197 
This ambiguity matters.  Depending on the standard applied, courts may 
consider different allegations and evidence, and may weigh those allegations 
and evidence differently.  Andrew C. Sand maintains that under the 
“substantial risk” standard, courts should consider “both the likelihood and 
magnitude of harm,” while under the “certainly impending” standard, courts 
should consider “only the likelihood that a threatened harm would occur.”198  
In Sand’s view, determining which standard applies requires determining 
whether the injury alleged is one of two different types of “probabilistic 
injuries”: (1) a “threatened injury” or (2) a “fear-based injury.”199  Sand 
defines “threatened injuries” as “future injuries in which injury to the 
plaintiff is anticipated but has not yet occurred,” and “fear-based injuries” as 
“present injuries in which the plaintiff suffers actual injury based on fear or 
anticipation of a threatened injury.”200 
Sand contends that “because fear-based injuries are suffered presently,” 
it is inappropriate to analyze them under a standard “based solely on the 
likelihood that harm will occur,” like the “certainly impending” standard.201  
Instead, they should be analyzed using a standard like the “substantial risk” 
standard that also considers the “magnitude of harm.”202  Sand categorizes 
“chilling-effect injuries” as “fear-based injuries.”203  Therefore, courts 
 
 196  See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 414 n.5 (2013)). 
 197  Mank, supra note 182, at 225; see also Chin, supra note 195, at 344 (stating that 
“Justice Alito not only made sure to contextualize the case, but also went out of his way to 
specify that the standing analysis was more likely to fail specifically because it arose in the 
national security context” and concluding that “[g]iven such extenuating circumstances, as 
well as Justice Alito’s carefully worded decision, it is reasonable to believe that this restrictive 
view of standing would and should be limited to its context”); Standing—Challenges to 
Government Surveillance, supra note 193, at 304 (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408–09) 
(arguing that the inconsistent standards articulated in Clapper along with dicta there noting 
that the Court’s “‘standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits 
of . . . an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government,’ 
particularly in cases challenging decisions of ‘the political branches in the fields of 
intelligence gathering and foreign affairs’” suggests that “‘certainly impending’ may only 
apply to litigants challenging governmental decisions in foreign affairs or intelligence.”). 
 198  Sand, supra note 15, at 732.  
 199  Id. at 713. 
 200  Id. (citing Brian Calabrese, Note, Fear-Based Standing: Cognizing an Injury-in-Fact, 
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1445, 1455–73 (2011)). 
 201  Id. at 732. 
 202  Id. 
 203  Id. Sand also maintains that the alleged injury in Clapper constituted a “fear-based 
injury” because the plaintiffs alleged that they had incurred “costly and burdensome 
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should analyze them under the “substantial risk” standard.204  Sand contends 
that “[t]he Clapper majority inappropriately blurred the distinction between 
future threatened injury and present fear-based injury.”205  In doing so, the 
Court applied an inappropriate standard.206 
In Glass, the district court and the Fifth Circuit exacerbated this 
problem when they rigidly applied the “certainly impending” standard.  Both 
courts failed to acknowledge footnote five and treated the alleged injury as a 
“threatened injury,” looking only at the likelihood of harm, and ignoring the 
magnitude of harm already suffered by the professors.  However, even if the 
plaintiffs had alleged only that students and faculty self-censor because they 
are afraid that hypothetical armed students might react violently to their 
speech, they would have alleged a “fear-based injury,” and not a “threatened 
injury,” because the alleged chill was “presently suffered.”207  Therefore, 
under Sand’s proposed methodology, the magnitude of harm the professors 
suffered would have been relevant.208 
But even if the courts’ interpretation of the “probabilistic” First 
Amendment injury framework were correct, a rigid application of that 
framework is inappropriate in cases involving First Amendment challenges 
to compulsory campus carry laws.  The First Amendment injury alleged by 
opponents of compulsory campus carry laws is not a “probabilistic” injury.  
It is a present chill caused by a present injury.209  The argument against 
compulsory carry laws is not based solely on the proposition that faculty and 
students self-censor because they are afraid of violent reprisals from armed 
students.210  The argument is also based on the proposition that the presence 
or perceived presence of lethal weapons in the classroom creates an 
atmosphere of intimidation that is so oppressive it chills classroom speech, 
independent of the real or hypothetical conduct of third parties.211  Students 
 
measures,” to avoid surveillance.  Id. at 732. 
 204  Sand, supra note 15, at 732. 
 205  Id. at 731.  Sand claims, however, that the Court applied the appropriate standard in 
footnote 5.  Id. at 732. 
 206  Id. at 731–32. 
 207  See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 34–35. 
 208  See Sand, supra note 15, at 732. 
 209  See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 34–35. 
 210  See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 3, at 80 (“Whether a student is actually carrying a weapon 
in the classroom is not the crux of the issue. The issue is that professors feel compelled to 
avoid topics that could incite confrontation now that concealed weapons could be present in 
their classrooms.”); see also Reply Brief, supra note 11, at 4; Supplemental Brief, supra note 
11, at 14 (“It is not the [professors] (or their students) being shot or having a gun waived in 
their face that is the immediate concern in terms of classroom pedagogy and method.  It is the 
context, both immediate and historical, that affects their conduct of the classroom.”); AAUP 
Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 5, 12, 17. 
 211  See Barnes, supra note 3; Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2117, 2127; Lewis & De 
Luna, supra note 3, at 139; Oblinger, supra note 3, at 109; Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, 
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and faculty members are injured as soon as the presence or perceived 
presence of firearms creates that environment.212 
Furthermore, unlike the plaintiffs in Laird and Clapper, who were 
never themselves subject to the regulations they challenged, plaintiffs 
challenging compulsory campus carry laws and policies are subject to those 
laws and policies whenever they enter a classroom at a public college or 
university in a state where such laws have been enacted.213  And they are not 
just subject to the laws in an abstract sense; they are physically subject to 
them.  Indeed, what makes campus carry cases so different from the 
“probabilistic harm” cases relied upon by the courts in Glass is the physical 
proximity of the plaintiffs to the alleged harm.214  They are literally in the 
same room as the deadly weapons that create that atmosphere of fear and 
intimidation. 
For these reasons, the alleged injury to faculty and students subject to 
compulsory carry laws is neither subjective nor speculative.  The alleged 
injury is an objective one: an “altered educational environment” of fear and 
intimidation.215  It does not require speculation about third-party conduct.  
Furthermore, that injury is readily traceable to the conduct of state and 
university officials.216  State and university officials are responsible for 
 
at 15–16, 27, 34–35; Reply Brief, supra note 11, at 4, 7–8; Supplemental Brief, supra note 
11, at 14; AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 5–6, 12, 17, 23. 
 212  See Barnes, supra note 3; Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2117, 2127; Lewis & De 
Luna, supra note 3, at 139; Oblinger, supra note 3, at 109. 
The professors are not asserting that sometime in the future they may 
decide that they need to curtail their classroom teaching activities because 
of SB 11’s implementation at UT-Austin.  Rather, they are asserting that 
SB 11’s implementation will affect them presently, leading them to 
dampen the kind of intellectual inquiry that they normally engage in with 
their students in class.  That is, from the beginning of guns-in-the-
classroom, academic activities will be adversely affected.  The professors 
are not subject to the new policy at some ill-defined future date.  The 
policy is (or was) effective the day classes started in August 2016—and 
its effects on them began that day and have continued since. 
Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 34–35. 
 213  See Jennifer L. Bruneau, Comment, Injury-in-Fact in Chilling Effect Challenges to 
Public University Speech Codes, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 975, 1002 (2015) (“[I]n Laird, there 
was no evidence that the plaintiff had been subject to government surveillance, but a student 
is always subject to the policies of the college or university in which he is enrolled.” (first 
citing DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 2008); and then citing Lopez v. 
Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2010))). 
 214  See Rachel Bayefsky, Psychological Harm and Constitutional Standing, 81 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1555, 1606 (2016) (arguing that in cases where plaintiffs allege standing based on 
psychological harm, “[g]eographical proximity to the source of the challenged legal violation 
is [a] tool that courts can use to gauge the nexus between the alleged violation and a particular 
plaintiff’s experience of psychological harm”). 
 215  See AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 5–6. 
 216  See id. at 17. 
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enacting and implementing campus carry laws and their attendant university 
policies.  Because those laws and policies create the environment described 
above, those laws and policies have caused or contributed to the chilling of 
speech in the classroom.217 
The framework used by the courts in Glass is inadequate for analyzing 
injury and causation in cases involving First Amendment challenges to 
compulsory campus carry laws.  The hostile speech environment framework 
would prove more appropriate. 
IV. THE HOSTILE SPEECH ENVIRONMENT 
The hostile speech environment framework presents an alternative, 
broader view of injury and causation that allows for a more accurate 
understanding of the alleged injuries in compulsory campus carry law cases.  
This “novel” framework adopts “terminology from Title VII’s ‘hostile work 
environment’ framework.”218  To understand how the hostile speech 
environment framework applies to campus carry law cases, it is important to 
first understand the development of the Title VII hostile work environment 
standard. 
A. Evolution of the Title VII Hostile Work Environment Framework 
The Title VII hostile work environment framework is useful for 
analyzing standing in compulsory campus carry law cases because the 
framework acknowledges that an individual or institution can injure a 
plaintiff through conduct that creates or contributes to an environment that 
is psychologically harmful, even when the individual or institution does not 
engage in specific acts that directly harm the plaintiff or, in some cases, even 
target the plaintiff.219  The framework developed to allow an employee to 
recover against an employer where the employee was subject to “a hostile or 
 
 217  Id. at 4; see also Supplemental Brief, supra note 11, at 14. 
 218  Juhan, supra note 12, at 1579. 
 219  See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (“[E]ven without regard 
to . . . tangible effects, the very fact that . . . discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive 
that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, 
religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.”); Joanna L. 
Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 671, 684 (2000) [hereinafter Grossman, First Bite] (“Sexual harassment that does not 
result in a tangible employment action is actionable, if at all, under a hostile work environment 
theory[,] . . . [which is] based on the notion that unwelcome sexual conduct, if sufficiently 
severe or pervasive, violates Title VII because it alters the terms and conditions of 
employment on the basis of sex.”); see also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual 
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1709 (1998) (“The concept of a hostile work environment 
was developed out of an awareness that some actions by supervisors or coworkers can create 
an atmosphere that undermines ‘the right to participate in the work place on [an] equal 
footing,’ even though these actions may not affect any tangible job benefit.”) (quoting King 
v. Bd. of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990))). 
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abusive work environment,”220 even where the employee could not 
demonstrate that the employer’s discriminatory conduct was “directly linked 
to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo,”221 or that it resulted in 
specific instances of “‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination.”222 
From the inception of the hostile work environment framework, its 
proponents acknowledged that discriminatory conduct need not be directly 
harmful to the plaintiff, or even precisely targeted at the plaintiff, for it to 
create or contribute to an abusive environment.223  The first court “to 
articulate[] the concept of hostile work environment harassment”224 was the 
Fifth Circuit in Rogers v. EEOC.225  In Rogers, a Hispanic employee filed an 
employment discrimination claim with the EEOC against the optometry 
practice for which she worked.226  In her EEOC charge, the employee alleged 
that her employer discriminated against her by, among other things, 
discriminating against the practice’s patients based on their ethnicity.227  As 
part of its investigation, the EEOC demanded evidence about the employer’s 
patients and their applications for services from the practice.228  The United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied this demand, 
concluding that even if the employer had discriminated against its patients, 
the employee had been not “aggrieved” by this conduct, as required by Title 
VII.229 
The Fifth Circuit reversed.230  In doing so, the court held, in effect, that 
even conduct that may not directly discriminate against an employee or even 
directly target that employee may nevertheless constitute discrimination if it 
 
 220  Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
 221  Id. at 65. 
The principal substantive distinction between harassment resulting in a 
tangible employment action (quid pro quo) and that not so resulting 
(hostile environment) is that the latter requires a showing that the 
harassment was severe and pervasive, while the former simply requires 
evidence that some tangible employment action was taken based on an 
employee’s refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual advances. 
Grossman, First Bite, supra note 219, at 681. 
 222  See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Grossman, First Bite, supra note 219, at 684; see also 
Schultz, supra note 219, at 1709.  
 223  See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 236–41 (5th Cir. 1971), disapproved by 
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984). 
 224  Schultz, supra note 219, at 1714.  
 225  Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. 
 226  Id. at 236. 
 227  Id. 
 228  Id. 
 229  Id. at 237 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 316 F. Supp. 422, 425 (E.D. Tex. 1970), rev’d, 
454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 230  Id. at 241. 
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creates or contributes to a discriminatory environment.231  The court 
determined that language in Title VII prohibiting an employer from 
discriminating against employees “with respect to [their]  
. . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”232 was “expansive” 
enough to “sweep[] within its protective ambit the practice of creating a 
working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial 
discrimination.”233  According to the Fifth Circuit, discrimination against an 
employers’ patients or customers “could be so employee demeaning as to 
constitute an invidious condition of employment.”234  After Rogers, courts 
continued to apply the hostile work environment framework in cases 
involving racial, religious, and national origin discrimination.235 
As the hostile work environment framework developed, its proponents 
continued to distinguish between conduct that directly injures plaintiffs and 
conduct that creates or contributes to a psychologically harmful 
environment.  The term “hostile work environment” was “first coined,” 
along with its “underlying analysis,” in 1979 by Catharine MacKinnon,236 
who adopted the hostile work environment framework into the sexual 
harassment context.237  The following year, when the EEOC first issued its 
sexual harassment guidelines, the agency incorporated MacKinnon’s 
 
 231  See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. 
I am simply not willing to hold that a discriminatory atmosphere could 
under no set of circumstances ever constitute an unlawful employment 
practice.  One can readily envision working environments so heavily 
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and 
psychological stability of minority group workers, and I think Section 703 
of Title VII was aimed at the eradication of such noxious practices. 
Id. 
 232  Id. at 238 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2018)). 
 233  Id. 
 234  Id. at 240. 
 235  See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (first citing 
Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514–15 (8th Cir. 1977); 
then citing Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976); then citing 
Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976), disapproved by Harrington v. 
Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978); and then citing Cariddi v. Kan. 
City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977)). 
 236  See Grossman, First Bite, supra note 219, at 679 (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 1–23 (1979)). 
 237  See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
445, 447 n.4 (1997) (citing MACKINNON, supra note 236, at 32 (noting that MacKinnon 
divided sexual harassment “into two categories: quid pro quo harassment and hostile or 
abusive environment harassment”); Joanna L. Grossman, Moving Forward, Looking Back: A 
Retrospective on Sexual Harassment Law, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1034 n.32 (2015) 
[hereinafter Grossman, Moving Forward] (quoting MACKINNON, supra note 236, at 32) 
(“MacKinnon distinguished between harassment ‘in which sexual compliance is exchanged, 
or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment opportunity,’ and harassment that is a 
‘persistent condition of work.’”). 
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“framework . . . virtually wholesale.”238 
In 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,239 the Supreme Court 
first adopted the hostile work environment framework into its own 
jurisprudence.240  There, the Court held for the first time that a sexual 
discrimination claim based on a hostile work environment cause of action 
“is actionable under Title VII.”241  According to the Court, a plaintiff may 
recover under Title VII by establishing that an employer’s discriminatory 
conduct “created a hostile or abusive work environment,” as long as the 
harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the 
victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”242 
In Meritor, a bank employee brought a Title VII sexual harassment 
action against her employer.243  The employee alleged that her supervisor at 
the bank repeatedly raped and sexually assaulted her, and continuously 
subjected her to unwanted sexual advances and acts of sexual coercion and 
exhibitionism.244  She further alleged that he harassed other female 
employees.245  The district court denied the employee’s claim, concluding 
that the employee “was not the victim of sexual harassment [or] sexual 
discrimination.”246  The district court based this conclusion on its assumption 
 
 238  Grossman, Moving Forward, at 1034 (citing Guidelines on Discrimination Because of 
Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, 74,677 (EEOC Nov. 10, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) 
(1980)).  The EEOC guidelines included under its definition of sexual harassment, 
“[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature,” not only when “submission to such conduct is made either 
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment,” or “submission to 
or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions 
affecting such individual,” but also when “such conduct has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive working environment.”  See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). 
 239  477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 240  See id. at 66–67 (“Since the Guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly held, and 
we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination 
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.” (first citing Henson v. City 
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982); then citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254–
55 (4th Cir. 1983); then citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 934–44 (D.C. Cir. 1981); and 
then citing Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984)).  
 241  Id. at 73. 
 242  Id. at 66–67 (alteration in original). 
 243  Id. at 60. 
 244  Id.  According to the employee, she initially agreed to have sexual intercourse with 
her supervisor “out of what she described as fear of losing her job.”  Id.  Her supervisor 
“thereafter made repeated demands upon her for sexual favors, usually at the branch, both 
during and after business hours; she estimated that over the next several years she had 
intercourse with him some 40 or 50 times.”  Id.  Additionally, her supervisor “fondled her in 
front of other employees, followed her into the women’s restroom when she went there alone, 
exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions.”  Id. 
 245  Meritor, 477 U.S. at 61. 
 246  Id. at 61.  Although the employee testified that the supervisor “touched and fondled 
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that sexual harassment required a tangible economic injury.247 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
reversed the decision of the district court, and the Supreme Court affirmed.248  
The Supreme Court concluded that language in Title VII that prohibited 
“discrimination with respect to ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges’ of employment” could apply to “purely psychological aspects of 
the workplace environment”249 and rejected the proposition that this 
language applied only to “‘tangible loss’ of ‘an economic character.’”250 
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,251 the Supreme Court reaffirmed and 
refined the Meritor standard.252  There, the Court held that a hostile work 
environment that “would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as 
hostile or abusive,” is actionable, even if it is not “psychologically 
injurious.”253  In Harris, the plaintiff, a former manager of an equipment 
rental company, brought a hostile work environment claim against the 
company because the company’s president “often insulted her because of her 
gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos.”254  The 
district court ruled that, although it was “a close case,” the president’s 
“conduct did not create an abusive environment,” and the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed.255  The Supreme Court reversed.256  The Court noted that it granted 
cert to “resolve a conflict among the Circuits on whether conduct, to be 
 
other women employees of the bank,” the district court also precluded the employee from 
presenting “wholesale evidence of a pattern and practice relating to sexual advances to other 
female employees in her case in chief, but advised her that she might well be able to present 
such evidence in rebuttal to the defendants’ cases,” which she declined to do.  See id. at 60–
61.  
 247  See id. at 67–68 (noting that “[t]he District Court apparently believed that a claim for 
sexual harassment will not lie absent an economic effect on the complainant’s employment”).  
 248  Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff’d and remanded sub nom. 
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 249  See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. 
 250  Id.  
 251  510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 252  Id. at 21–23. 
 253  Id. at 22 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67). 
 254  Id. at 19.  According to the findings of a magistrate judge, the president “told [the 
plaintiff] on several occasions, in the presence of other employees, ‘[y]ou’re a woman, what 
do you know’ and ‘[w]e need a man as the rental manager.’”  Id.  On at least one occasion, 
“he told her she was ‘a dumb ass woman.’”  Id.  On another occasion, “in front of others, he 
suggested that the two of them ‘go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [the plaintiff’s] raise.’”  Id.  
In other instances, he “asked [the plaintiff] and other female employees to get coins from his 
front pants pocket,” “threw objects on the ground in front of [the plaintiff] and other women, 
and asked them to pick the objects up,” and “made sexual innuendos about [the plaintiff’s] 
and other women’s clothing.”  Id.  Once, moreover, “[w]hile [the plaintiff] was arranging a 
deal with [a customer], he asked her, again in front of other employees, ‘[w]hat did you do, 
promise the guy . . . some [sex] Saturday night?’”  Id. 
 255  Id. at 20. 
 256  Id. at 23. 
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actionable as ‘abusive work environment’ harassment . . . must ‘seriously 
affect [an employee’s] psychological well-being’ or lead the plaintiff to 
‘suffe[r] injury.’”257  The Court held that it did not.258  According to the 
Court: 
         Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct 
leads to a nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive 
work environment, even one that does not seriously affect 
employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will 
detract from employees’ job performance, discourage 
employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from 
advancing in their careers.  Moreover, even without regard to 
these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory 
conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work 
environment abusive to employees because of their race, 
gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad 
rule of workplace equality.259 
The Title VII hostile work environment framework acknowledges that 
the conduct of an individual or an institution can result in injury to a plaintiff 
by impacting the “purely psychological aspects of the . . . environment” as a 
whole,260 even where the individual or the institution may not have directly 
and tangibly injured or even targeted the plaintiff.261  By adapting this 
framework to a First Amendment context, a hostile speech environment 
framework would provide a better means for analyzing First Amendment 
challenges to compulsory campus carry laws. 
B. From the Hostile Work Environment to the Hostile Speech 
Environment 
S. Cagle Juhan first proposed the hostile speech environment as a 
“novel” cause of action to address what he perceived to be problems with 
public universities’ attempts to regulate hate speech and impose respect for 
diversity.262  Juhan was concerned that the existing First Amendment free 
speech framework was insufficient to address what he considered to be 
“pervasive efforts [by university administrators] to alienate, chastise, punish, 
 
 257  Harris, 510 U.S. at 20 (alterations in original). 
 258  Id. at 22. 
 259  Id. 
 260  See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
 261  See Schultz, supra note 219, at 1714–15 (“[T]he original impetus behind creating the 
cause of action was to ensure that the prohibition against discrimination extended to actions 
that did not in and of themselves effect a tangible job detriment.”); id. at 1715 (“The cause of 
action for hostile work environment harassment, however, was devised precisely to cover 
situations that do not affect the plaintiffs’ jobs in any tangible or ultimate sense.”); see also 
Grossman, First Bite, supra note 219, at 681. 
 262  See Juhan, supra note 12, at 1579. 
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or indoctrinate those who hold or espouse hateful or unpopular views”263 
because, in his view, “isolated incidents are often insufficiently severe to 
warrant the investment of time and money necessary to advocate for one’s 
rights.”264  According to Juhan, the hostile speech environment cause of 
action could protect “free speech by ensuring that colleges and universities 
cannot inflict a First Amendment death by a thousand cuts.”265 
The suggestion that a Title VII hostile work environment framework 
should be used to prevent colleges and universities from addressing the 
precise type of discriminatory conduct Title VII was meant to address is 
perverse on its face and unsound for reasons beyond the scope of this Article.  
Nevertheless, the notion that students should be able to challenge laws and 
policies that create an environment that itself chills speech is a sound one.  
Under the Title VII framework, an employee can establish that an employer’s 
conduct was discriminatory by demonstrating that the conduct created an 
abusive environment, even where the employer’s conduct did not directly 
target or tangibly injure the employee.266  Under the hostile speech 
environment framework, a plaintiff could similarly establish that a state or 
university officials’ conduct chilled classroom speech by demonstrating that 
that conduct created an environment that was itself hostile toward classroom 
speech, even if that conduct did not directly target or tangibly267 injure the 
plaintiff.268 
V. COMPULSORY CAMPUS CARRY LAWS AND THE HOSTILE SPEECH 
ENVIRONMENT 
A. Defining a Hostile Speech Environment Standard 
Juhan proposed the hostile speech environment as a separate cause of 
action, and suggested the following three elements:269 (1) the First 
Amendment must protect the plaintiff’s speech;270 (2) “state action traceable 
 
 263  Id. at 1595. 
 264  Id. at 1603. 
 265  Id. 
 266  See J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 
2297 (1999) (“Even if individual acts do not constitute a hostile environment separately, they 
can be actionable when taken together.  The test is whether the conduct, taken as a whole, 
would lead to an environment that the employee reasonably perceives as abusive.”); 
Grossman, First Bite, supra note 219, at 686 (“[W]here . . . harassment manifests as a 
longstanding pattern of conduct, no individual incident need be particularly severe in order 
for the environment to be actionable.”). 
 267  See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (recognizing that an 
intangible harm can constitute an injury-in-fact for Article III standing purposes). 
 268  See Juhan, supra note 12, at 1595, 1600–03. 
 269  Id. at 1600. 
 270  Id. 
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to [a state] university must regulate, chill, or suppress the [plaintiff’s] 
protected speech”;271 and (3) “the hostility manifested by [the] state 
university towards a speaker must be ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive’ as to 
reasonably affect the speaker’s speech and create an environment objectively 
abusive towards that speech.”272 
This Article recommends adopting the hostile speech environment 
framework only as a means of analyzing injury and causation in cases 
involving First Amendment challenges to compulsory campus carry laws, 
and not as a separate cause of action.  Nevertheless, the second and third 
elements parallel the injury-in-fact and causation elements of the Supreme 
Court’s standard for establishing Article III standing.273  Therefore, for 
purposes of analyzing standing in cases involving campus carry laws, this 
Article suggests focusing on the questions of whether “state action traceable” 
to state and university officials was hostile toward classroom speech in a 
manner “‘sufficiently severe or pervasive’ as to reasonably affect [that] 
speech and create an environment objectively abusive towards that 
speech.”274  Furthermore, just as a hostile work environment is actionable if 
it can “reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive,” 275 
so too would a hostile speech environment be actionable if it can “reasonably 
be perceived, and is perceived, as” so hostile to speech as to chill that 
speech.276 
B. Applying the Hostile Speech Environment Framework in 
Compulsory Campus Carry Law Cases 
The hostile speech environment framework is well-suited to cases in 
which plaintiffs raise First Amendment challenges to compulsory campus 
carry laws.  As an initial matter, when opponents of campus carry laws 
contend that the presence, or even potential presence, of firearms in the 
classroom itself chills speech,277 they are in essence arguing that laws that 
 
 271  Id. 
 272  Id. at 1600–01 (first citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); and 
then citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). 
 273  See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining the Article III 
standing requirements). 
 274  See Juhan, supra note 12, at 1601 (first citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; and then citing 
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67). 
 275  See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. 
 276  Id.; see also Siegel, supra note 142, at 922 (arguing that “[t]he standard for testing a 
claim of chill [should] be the standard that rules all such claims in our legal system: the 
reasonable person test. The trial court would ask whether the challenged governmental action 
would chill a reasonable person in the way the plaintiff claims to be chilled”). 
 277  See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 15–16, 27, 34–35; Reply Brief, supra note 11, 
at 4, 7–8; Supplemental Brief, supra note 11, at 14; AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 
5–6, 12, 17, 23; Barnes, supra note 3, at 79; Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2117, 2127; 
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permit the presence of firearms in the classroom create an environment so 
hostile to speech as to chill that speech.  At the heart of these arguments is 
the proposition that because firearms have enormous lethal potential, and 
because the harm they can cause can be almost instantaneous, they possess 
a “unique capacity to arouse fear in some people simply through their 
presence,”278 or even through their potential presence.279  Therefore, critics 
of compulsory campus carry laws maintain that the knowledge that firearms 
may be present in the classroom is sufficient to create an environment in 
which students and faculty members are too intimidated to engage in 
classroom discussions, especially when those discussions involve 
controversial topics.280  As Laura Houser Oblinger has noted, “[e]ven if a 
shot is never fired, a gun’s presence can still have the effect of intimidation 
or suppression, which would inhibit healthy academic discourse.”281 
Opponents of compulsory carry laws argue, in essence, both that the 
presence of firearms in the classroom creates an environment that is hostile 
to free speech, and that the perception of that environment as hostile to 
speech is reasonable.  In doing so, they rely on empirical evidence, both 
statistical and anecdotal, that supports the proposition that the presence of 
firearms in an academic setting creates an environment of intimidation.  As 
Shaundra K. Lewis has noted, multiple studies indicate “that the majority of 
students are uncomfortable with firearms being inside academic buildings, 
 
Lewis & De Luna, supra note 3, at 139; Oblinger, supra note 3, at 109. 
 278  Wyer, supra note 3, at 1016. 
 279  See, e.g., AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 17–18; Barnes, supra note 3, at 84 
(“The potential presence of concealed weapons chills speech within the classroom.  If speech 
is chilled, scholarship cannot flourish, and academic freedom is infringed.”). 
 280  See, e.g., Appellants’ Brief, supra note 12, at 16 (“[S]tudies suggest that classmates’ 
knowledge that a fellow student has a gun in class will impede a professor’s ability to generate 
discussion on controversial topics, which is a core teaching function.”); Barnes, supra note 3, 
at 79 (“The presence of concealed carry weapons within the classroom directs the content of 
the professor’s discourse away from controversial topics that may be contrary to popular 
opinion.  This aversion to provocative content to preserve the safety of the class impedes the 
free inquiry of scholarship, which is exactly what the doctrine of academic freedom was 
created to prevent.”); Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2112, 2123, 2128–29 (noting that (1) 
“students who feel uncomfortable in the presence of firearms may be afraid to freely engage 
in debates over controversial issues”; (2) the presence of “[f]irearms may discourage students 
from expressing unpopular political perspectives”; (3) “[k]nowing that their classmates may 
be carrying pistols may dissuade some students from voicing diverse or unpopular intellectual, 
political, or social ideas out of fear that they may be shot by someone with strongly held 
opposing views in the heat of an argument.”; and (4) “[k]nowing that students may be carrying 
concealed firearms may cause professors to avoid discussing provocative, delicate or political 
issues”); Lewis & De Luna, supra note 3, at 139 (“Undoubtedly, knowing that their 
classmates, professors, or administrators are ‘packing’ will make students more reluctant to 
debate controversial and sensitive topics or to challenge a professor over a grade.”).  
 281  Oblinger, supra note 3, at 109 (citing Joan H. Miller, Comment, The Second 
Amendment Goes to College, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 235, 260 (2011)). 
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including classrooms.”282  According to Professor Lewis, “[i]f they are 
uncomfortable, they cannot learn in violation of their constitutional 
academic freedom.”283 
In a 2013 study, a group of health sciences professors surveyed students 
from fifteen randomly selected public universities in the Midwest about their 
“perceptions and practices regarding carrying concealed handguns on 
university campuses.”284  Of the 1,649 students who responded, 79% did not 
support allowing concealed carry permit holders to carry firearms on 
university grounds.285  A nearly equal percentage felt that allowing concealed 
carry on campus would make most students feel unsafe.286 
In 2014, another group of health sciences professors, which included 
some of those involved in the 2013 study, randomly surveyed “college and 
university presidents regarding their support for concealed handguns being 
carried on college campuses.”287  Of the 401 college and university 
presidents who responded, 95% did not support allowing concealed carry on 
campus.288  Moreover, 89% “perceived that most . . . students . . . would feel 
unsafe” under such conditions.289  Additionally, in a survey of college faculty 
and staff members in Kansas, conducted after the passage of a Kansas State 
law permitting concealed firearms on college and university campuses, “82 
percent said they would feel less safe if students were allowed to carry 
concealed handguns on campus.”290 
Opponents of compulsory campus carry laws have also pointed to 
multiple documented cases of potential students and faculty members 
 
 282  Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2128. 
 283  Id. 
 284  See Amy Thompson et al., Student Perceptions and Practices Regarding Carrying 
Concealed Handguns on University Campuses, 61 J. AM. C. HEALTH 243, 243–45 (2013); see 
also Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2128 n.116 (citing Marc Ransford, Study: Most College 
and University Presidents Don’t Want Guns on Campus, BALL ST. U. (June 2, 2014), 
http://cms.bsu.edu/news/articles/2014/6/study-most-college-and-university-presidents-dont-
want-guns-on-campus).  
 285  Thompson et al., supra note 284, at 247. 
 286  Id. 
 287  See James H. Price et al., University Presidents’ Perceptions and Practice Regarding 
the Carrying of Concealed Handguns on College Campuses, 62 J. AM. C. HEALTH 461, 461 
(2014). 
 288  Id. at 463; see also Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2111 n.4 (citing Price et al., supra 
note 287, at 463).  
 289  Price et al., supra note 287, at 463.  
 290  Ryan Newton, Survey: Kansas Shows Strong Opposition to Law Allowing Guns on 
Campus, KSN.COM (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.ksn.com/news/local/kansas-shows-strong-
opposition-to-law-allowing-guns-on-campus/1024162729; see also Wolcott, supra note 3, at 
883 n.51 (citing Sam Zeff, Kansas Campuses Prepare for Guns in Classrooms, NPR ED (Mar. 
22, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/03/22/470717996/kansas-campuses-prepare-
for-guns-in-classrooms). 
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avoiding or leaving schools, including highly-ranked schools, at which 
firearms are permitted in the classroom.291  Following the passage of Texas’s 
compulsory campus carry law, multiple students cited the law as their reason 
for rejecting offers from UT.292  In one example, a UT graduate and 
prospective law student asserted that he decided not to attend the University 
of Texas at Austin Law School, despite a “deep” and “emotional connection” 
to the University and the “great value” it offered “in the face of rising law 
school tuition across the nation.”293  The student said that he based his 
decision in part on Texas’s recently enacted campus carry law.294  In another 
example, a prospective graduate student declined an offer to pursue her 
masters’ degree at UT because of the university’s Campus Carry policy.295  
Both students specifically stated that they would fear speaking openly about 
sensitive topics in a classroom where firearms were present.296 
Similarly, multiple faculty members or potential faculty members have 
left or declined positions at UT following the passage of Texas’s campus 
carry law.297  After the law passed, Daniel Hamermesh, a professor emeritus 
of economics, announced his withdrawal from his position.298  Similarly, 
 
 291  See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 3, at 86; Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2128, 2141–
42 nn.115, 203 (first citing Tom Dart, Texas Academics Told to Avoid “Sensitive Topics” if 
Gun Law Goes into Effect, GUARDIAN (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/feb/24/university-of-houston-faculty-campus-carry-law-texas-guns; and then 
citing Liam Stack, Dean at University of Texas Resigns in Part Over Handgun Law, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/27/us/dean-at-university-of-texas-
resigns-in-part-over-handgun-law.html); Lewis & De Luna, supra note 3, at 139–40; see also 
AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 19 nn.13–14 (first citing Michael Martinez & Don 
Melvin, Texas Dean Quits, Partly Over State’s New Campus Gun Law, CNN (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/26/us/texas-professor-quits-gun-law/index.html; and then 
citing Eleanor Dearman & W. Gardner Selby, Professor: “Concrete Examples” of Teachers, 
Students Spurning University of Texas Due to Gun Law, POLITIFACT TEX. (Aug. 26, 2016), 
https://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2016/aug/26/lisa-moore/professor-concrete-
examples-teachers-students-spur/). 
 292  See Andrew Wilson, Why I Wouldn’t Go to the University of Texas Law School, 
NATION (May 5, 2016), http://www.thenation.com/article/why-i-wouldnt-go-to-the-
university-of-texas-law-school; Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2128 n.115; Dart, supra 
note 291; Dearman & Selby, supra note 291. 
 293  See Wilson, supra note 292. 
 294  Id. 
 295  See Dart, supra note 291; see also Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2128 n.115. 
 296  See Dart, supra note 291 (quoting graduate student who declined admission to UT as 
stating, “If I know a person could have a gun in class I’m not so interested in speaking 
openly”); Wilson, supra note 292 (noting that law students “must grapple with the stress of 
grades and careers, but also with topics like abortion and marriage equality, adding fuel to the 
fire,” and asserting, “[t]he potential for offense in legal classrooms is high, and adding guns 
in the mix is dangerous”). 
 297  See, e.g., Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2128, 2141–42 nn.115, 203; Lewis & De 
Luna, supra note 3, at 139–40; Dart, supra note 291; Dearman & Selby, supra note 291; 
Martinez & Melvin, supra note 291; see also AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 19 n.13.  
 298  Samantha Ketterer, Citing Concerns with Campus Carry, Professor Emeritus to 
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Frederick Steiner, the Dean of UT’s School of Architecture, stated that 
Texas’s campus carry law “was ‘a factor’ in his decision to leave [UT].”299  
Both Hamermesh and Steiner found the proposition of guns in the classroom 
intimidating.300  Another UT professor stated that she “personally [knew] of 
at least two cases of senior faculty hires in which a top candidate withdrew 
[one from Harvard, one from the University of Virginia], citing concern over 
[Texas’s campus carry laws].”301  In an open letter to UT, moreover, 
sociologist Harry Edwards “rescind[ed] all association and affiliation with 
[a] lecture forum [at UT] named in [his] honor.”302  Other potential faculty 
members have declined teaching or speaking positions at UT because of 
Texas’s campus carry law.303 
Opponents of campus carry laws have also pointed to evidence of self-
censoring on the part of faculty because of the presence of firearms on 
campus.304  After Texas enacted its campus carry law, the faculty senate at 
the University of Houston warned faculty members in a slideshow that they 
“may want to be careful discussing sensitive topics; drop certain topics from 
[their] curriculum; not ‘go there’ if  [they] sense anger; limit student access 
off hours; go to appointment-only office hours; [and] only meet ‘that student’ 
in controlled circumstances.”305 
Under a hostile speech environment framework, evidence that some 
students or faculty members may not feel intimated by the presence or 
perceived presence of firearms would not establish the absence of a hostile 
speech environment any more than evidence that some employees are not 
offended by an employer’s discriminatory conduct would establish the 
absence of a hostile work environment.  The question is whether such fear is 
 
Withdraw from University, DAILY TEXAN (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.dailytexanonline.com/ 
2015/10/07/citing-concerns-with-campus-carry-professor-emeritus-to-withdraw; see also 
Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2111 n.7. 
 299  Martinez & Melvin, supra note 291.  
 300  According to Hamermesh, “With a huge group of students, my perception is that the 
risk that a disgruntled student might bring a gun into the classroom and start shooting at me 
has been substantially enhanced by the concealed-carry law.”  Ketterer, supra note 298.  
Steiner stated, “When you have a stressful situation like exams, performance review or studio, 
I don’t see how a firearm can enhance that learning experience[.]”  Martinez & Melvin, supra 
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reasonable.306  As Laura Houser Oblinger has noted, moreover, “[i]f even 
one person in each classroom felt uncomfortable by the presence of guns, 
that one person is prevented from freely and comfortably participating in 
classroom and campus debates, thereby contravening the purpose of higher 
education.”307 
Based on the above, opponents of the campus carry laws could use the 
hostile speech environment framework to demonstrate that the presence or 
perceived presence of firearms in classrooms creates an environment that is 
severely and pervasively hostile toward speech, and that state and university 
officials create such an environment by enacting and implementing 
compulsory campus carry laws and policies.  Therefore, if that environment 
leads students or faculty members to self-censor, those officials have caused 
the chilling of their speech. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Rigid application of the Supreme Court’s current framework for cases 
involving fear-based First Amendment injuries present a roadblock to 
students and faculty members seeking to challenge compulsory campus carry 
laws on First Amendment grounds.  It should not, however, be a permanent 
barrier.  The hostile speech environment framework offers a way forward. 
 
 
 306  See supra Part V.A. 
 307  Oblinger, supra note 3, at 109. 
